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Mind the Gap: Explaining Problems with International Law 
Where Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Meet
Critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP) policy emphasizes the 
importance of protecting such 
infrastructure from vulnerabilities 
associated with information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) 
and recognizing that networked 
ICTs (and the network architecture) 
constitute critical infrastructure. 
Similarly, cybersecurity policy 
identifies CIP as an objective. The 
CIP-focused and cybersecurity 
approaches have stressed the need 
for international cooperation, 
including the value of developing 
international legal rules. However, 
after over a decade of experience, 
a gap persists between the much-
proclaimed need for more effective 
international law in this area and 
the international law that exists.
Three factors explain the gap’s 
persistence. First, cooperation on 
CIP and its cyber features devel-
oped within existing diplomatic 
mechanisms without requiring new 
international law. Second, patterns 
in cybersecurity policy affect what 
states seek to achieve and how they 
use international law. Third, inter-
national politics on cybersecurity 
increasingly reflect geo-political 
competition—a context that has 
never proved conducive to inter-
national law. These factors create 
obstacles for developing inter-
national law on the cyber aspects 
of CIP, meaning that the existing 
gap might go from persistent to 
permanent.
International Cooperation on
Critical Cyber Infrastructure 
Efforts to bolster CIP, including its 
cyber aspects, include international 
cooperation. National CIP strategies 
identify such cooperation as critical; 
bilateral relations often involve CIP 
elements; regional organizations, 
such as the European Union and 
Organization of American States, 
facilitate collaboration on CIP; 
security organizations, such as 
NATO and the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, work on CIP; 
and multilateral institutions, such 
as the UN, stress the importance of 
cooperation to achieve better CIP. 
With some exceptions, this coop-
eration has proceeded without the 
need for, or the production of, 
new international legal rules or 
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instruments specific to the protec-
tion of critical cyber infrastructure. 
Generally, this cooperation focuses 
on building domestic capacities 
to identify and respond to cyber 
threats, sharing information on 
threats and effective cybersecurity 
practices, providing assistance when 
requested, and devoting regular dip-
lomatic attention to this challenge. 
Existing diplomatic or treaty-based 
mechanisms have proved flexible 
enough to allow cybersecurity and 
its CIP elements to become part of 
the agenda. Although most coopera-
tive efforts have not generated new 
international law specific to the 
protection of critical cyber infra-
structure, they echo international 
law on transboundary pollution and 
industrial accidents, which includes 
responsibilities to prevent and 
mitigate threats, consult and share 
information, provide assistance, and 
engage in periodic diplomacy to 
improve cooperation.
Specific international rules and 
mechanisms that have emerged are 
limited in scope or substance. For 
example, the EU requires members 
to identify “European critical 
infrastructure” in the energy and 
transport sectors, provide informa-
tion about such designations, and 
mandate that operators have securi-
ty plans.1 Members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization agreed to 
1 Council Directive 2008/114/EC 345/75-345/76, Dec. 8, 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0
075:0082:EN:PDF.
2 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, 2008, Art. 3.
3 Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for Cyber Security in Africa, Jan. 1, 2011. Art. 
III-1-4, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/events/2011/WDOcs/CA_5/Draft%20Convention%20on%20
Cyberlegislation%20in%20Africa%20Draft0.pdf.
4 International Group of Experts, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual?e=5903855/1802381.
cooperate on “[e]nsuring informa-
tion security of critical structures of 
the Parties.”2  A draft African Union 
treaty requires parties to adopt 
a national cybersecurity policy 
that includes protecting “essential 
information infrastructure.”3
To date, state practice reveals a 
preference for using existing mecha-
nisms for cooperation on CIP and 
its cyber components rather than 
establishing new legal regimes. 
Proposals to create-cyber specific 
international law, such as an obliga-
tion to provide assistance to victims 
of cyber attacks or prohibitions 
against attacks on the Internet’s root 
servers, have not gained diplomatic 
traction. Whether this preference 
remains dominant will depend, in 
part, on how cybersecurity policy 
changes and what impact those 
changes have on prospects for using 
international law.
Patterns in Cybersecurity Policy 
and Their International Legal 
Implications
Although cybersecurity policy 
is complex, three patterns have 
emerged. First, policymakers have 
used a “cyber threat” approach in 
which they classify an incident into 
existing categories—crime, terror-
ism, espionage, and armed con-
flict—and then apply the policies 
and legal rules associated with each 
category. International law exists 
for each category, but states have so 
far only developed specific inter-
national law for cyber crime (e.g., 
Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime). For terrorism, espio-
nage, and armed conflict, pre-cyber 
international law is applied to cyber 
incidents (e.g., the law of armed 
conflict).
However, experts debate the efficacy 
of this approach, with critics observ-
ing that international law on crime, 
terrorism, espionage, and armed 
conflict cannot handle cyber threats 
adequately. Although it is the most 
prominent cyber crime instrument, 
the Convention on Cybercrime’s 
effectiveness has been challenged, 
especially because of its limited 
number of state parties (39 as of 
June 2013). Further, international 
law does not seriously constrain 
espionage, which creates a permis-
sive context that adversely affects 
CIP. Despite recent efforts to clarify 
how the law of armed conflict 
applies to cyber warfare,4 its 
utility for CIP during armed 
conflict remains unclear.
The second pattern in cybersecurity 
policy is the “cyber defense” 
approach, which focuses on 
defending against cyber threats 
regardless of their type or origin. 
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This approach adopts an “all haz-
ards” strategy that does not require 
slotting cyber intrusions into 
existing policy and legal categories. 
The motivation behind emphasizing 
cyber defense relates to concerns 
that the cyber-threat approach is too 
reactive, faces technical and legal 
attribution problems, and fails to 
achieve prevention, deterrence, or 
resilience.
Stressing cyber defense produces 
different legal issues, including 
the impact of “active defenses” on 
the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention, the effect of 
heightened electronic surveillance 
and information sharing on civil 
liberties, the problem of regulating 
critical infrastructure operated by 
the private sector, and ideological 
disagreements about Internet gov-
ernance. While the cyber-threat ap-
proach applies existing law (lex lata) 
to cyber incidents, the cyber-defense 
approach more directly raises 
questions about what law should be 
(lex ferenda), which stimulate larger 
considerations about governance 
on which consensus does not exist 
(e.g., how should cybersecurity and 
privacy be balanced?; should Inter-
net governance be more intergov-
ernmental or multi-stakeholder in 
nature?; and should it emphasize 
sovereignty or “Internet freedom”?). 
The lack of consensus limits what 
states can achieve through inter-
national law when cyber defense is 
the focus.
The third pattern involves emphasis 
on developing “full spectrum” cyber 
capabilities—the technological 
ability to defend against, deter, 
and—if needed—defeat cyber 
threats. This “cyber technology” 
approach holds that focusing on 
defensive measures is inadequate 
because, in cyberspace, the 
offense always has the advantage. 
Cybersecurity requires technological 
capabilities that permit not only 
robust defense but also offensive 
operations. This pattern is promi-
nent in U.S. policy, as evidenced by 
actual and contemplated offensive 
cyber attacks against states and 
terrorist websites, development of 
“full spectrum” cyber capabilities 
by the military and intelligence 
community, and establishment of 
“rules of engagement” for offensive 
operations. Experts believe many 
countries, ranging from China to 
Iran, are scaling up their intelligence 
(Continued  from Page 3)
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and military cyber capabilities. 
However, this pattern creates 
problems for collective action. For 
example, though keen on cyber 
defense, NATO members, to date, 
have resisted discussing the Alliance 
developing offensive cyber capabili-
ties or engaging in offensive cyber 
operations.
The cyber-technology approach 
connects more with material power 
than application of lex lata or 
development of lex ferenda. Tech-
nological prowess, rather than law, 
determines how well critical cyber 
infrastructure is protected from 
cyber attack. The cyber-technology 
approach moves policy closer to 
managing cybersecurity through 
balance-of-power politics, including 
making credible the threat to use 
cyber capabilities to deter serious 
attacks on critical infrastructure. In 
other contexts, international law 
has not fared well when balance-
of-power politics characterized the 
dynamics of international relations.
Geo-Politics, Cybersecurity, and 
Critical Infrastructure Protection
In addition to these patterns, 
cybersecurity policy has shifted 
in emphasis. Although each 
pattern remains part of cyber-
security, the patterns overlap in 
ways that reveal a restless search for 
more effective strategies. In the CIP 
context, policymakers have not been 
content to rely on international 
legal instruments on cyber crime 
but have moved to bolster cyber 
defenses against the range of cyber 
threats that exist against critical 
infrastructure. Experts perceive that 
more powerful countries, includ-
ing China, Russia, and the United 
States, are not basing strategies 
on defensive measures alone but 
are developing “full spectrum” 
capabilities to defend against, deter, 
and defeat serious cyber attacks.
This shift flows from not only the 
evolution of thinking about cyber 
threats but also the rise of cyber-
security as a strategic problem in 
competition among the great 
powers, especially between the 
United States and China. Recent 
events illustrated how raw cyber-
security issues have become in 
Sino-American relations, with the 
United States accusing China of 
cyber theft of U.S. companies’ 
trade secrets, and China accusing 
the United States of cyber attacks 
against Chinese targets (accusa-
tions assisted by Edward Snowdon’s 
revelations about secret U.S. cyber 
activities). Although both countries 
have discussed these problems at 
a summit and created a working 
group to address cyber issues, the 
prospects for new international 
agreements from this process are, in 
the current climate of deep mistrust, 
not good.
Geo-political tensions do not 
preclude great powers from 
cooperating, as illustrated by 
new U.S.-Russia cybersecurity 
initiatives announced in June 2013, 
which include confidence-building 
measures (e.g., information sharing) 
and a “cyber hot line.” However, 
whether these kinds of initiatives 
will change the trajectory of 
cybersecurity in great power politics 
is doubtful. Confidence-building 
measures might permit countries to 
cooperate better on, for example, 
cyber crime, but such measures do 
not address strategic tensions related 
to the threats cyber espionage and 
military cyber capabilities present to 
critical infrastructure. And tensions 
continue to mount, as illustrated 
by CIP concerns about the security 
of global ICT supply chains and 
the licit and illicit markets for 
“zero day” software exploits. The 
distrust among the great powers on 
these strategic and emerging issues 
represents an obstacle to develop-
ment of more cyber-specific rules of 
international law that might benefit 
CIP.
The gap between calls for additional 
international law on cybersecurity 
and critical cyber infrastructure, 
but existing international law will 
persist despite cooperation on CIP 
and its cyber aspects having taken 
root around the world. Although 
existing rules and mechanisms 
facilitate cooperation, policy shifts 
in cybersecurity are creating a 
more difficult environment for 
international law with respect to 
applying these rules and developing 
more cyber-specific norms. Given 
this reality, progress in international 
cooperation on CIP will depend 
less on new international law 
than on maximizing the potential 
like-minded states can wring from 
existing regimes, diplomatic venues, 
and technological capabilities. v
